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I Articles I
The Law and Politics of Engaging
Resistance in Investment Dispute Settlement
Ibironke T. Odumosu*
I. Introduction: The Phases of Investment Dispute Settlement
The international law on foreign investment, like other areas of
international law, has experienced several phases in the course of its
development and still continues its metamorphosis in the 2 1s century. In
no area of foreign investment law is this more pronounced than in
investor-state arbitration.1 Historically, developed states catalyzed and
responded to occurrences in the international economic order, while
Third World states largely reacted to the changes that emerged.
However, the 21" t century has shown a more pronounced Third World
(groups and peoples) engagement with investment activities that have
* Ph.D. Candidate and Sessional Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of British
Columbia, Canada. I immensely appreciate the ongoing conversations with Professors
Karin Mickelson, Obiora Okafor and James Gathii on the Third World's engagement
with international law. Many thanks also to Mosope Fagbongbe, and to all those who
graciously responded to my interview questions.
1. While most of the cases discussed in this article are investor-state arbitration
cases, the broader term--"investment dispute settlement"--is often adopted because it
has the capacity to capture state-state disputes, state-investor disputes as well as investor-
state disputes. In some specific instances in the article, references are made mostly to
investor-state dispute settlement and sometimes to state-state dispute settlement.
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appeared in investor-state arbitration jurisprudence. This Third World
involvement threatens the status quo of investor-state arbitration as an
institutionalized and depoliticized system that is reserved exclusively to
states, foreign investors, and recently, non-disputing parties that are
granted amicus curiae privileges before tribunals. The changing locus of
interaction has been largely resisted by the tribunals constituted under the
auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID"), the institution that forms the focus of analysis in this
article.2
Before ICSID's establishment in the decolonization/early
postcolonial era, investment dispute settlement mechanisms had
commenced their emergence in the colonial era, and beginning in the mid
1990s, there has been yet another era, which I term, the new phase of
investment dispute settlement. 3  Each phase-the colonial era, the
decolonization/early postcolonial era and the new phase/era-proceeds
with a common purpose, mostly articulated in the form of protection of
global capital and states' economic well-being. While the distinct
investment protection purpose still predominates, it competes with the
new agenda of some developed states to rewrite, or at least, amend
applicable rules to accommodate their interests as defendants. In spite of
the phases' similar focus and agenda, international actors adopt different
strategies and appropriate 'technologies' for achieving their purposes.4
Before proceeding with an analysis of these technologies, a brief
exposition of these phases (with a focus on ICSID) is necessary as it sets
the background for an analysis of the law and politics of investment
dispute settlement in the present era.
A. The Colonial Era
Like most areas of international law, the international law on
foreign investment developed partly in response to and as a component
of broader Third World-developed state relations. In the colonial era, the
primary motivating factor was developed states' desire to protect the
property of their nationals in Third World countries, prompting Professor
2. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M 532 (1965) [hereinafter ICSID
Convention].
3. Cf Kenneth Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment
Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 157 (2005) (discussing the history of
international investment agreements ("IIAs")). While Vandevelde focused on IIAs, this
article analyzes investment dispute settlement and its interaction with the Third World.
4. The use of the term "technologies" in this article denotes the strategies and
methods that major actors in the international investment order adopt in response to the
challenges and developments in each phase of the development of the international
investment order.
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Anghie to allude to the "colonial origins of foreign investment law as an
academic discipline." 5 Many of the customary international law rules
that apply to foreign investment, especially regarding the protection of
the property of aliens, were developed in this era.
6
During the colonial era, foreign investment protection was assured
through the instrumentality of merging the legal systems of the colonized
and the colonial power, and where this failed or where the territory in
question was independent of a colonial power, foreign investment
protection was assured through gun-boat diplomacy.7 As a result of this
colonial paradigm, the need for an international dispute settlement
institution was minimal. This was the age when states espoused the
(commercial) interests of their nationals. Because of the power
asymmetry that prevailed in this era, and the reality of colonization,
many states that now self-identify as part of the Third World did not
directly and effectively participate in the development of international
foreign investment law, even though the law emerged through
interactions with these states.
At this time, dispute settlement was mostly a state-state relationship.
This dispute settlement format partially explains the significant exclusion
of many colonies from the formal (non-violent) processes of dispute
settlement because they were not independent and were largely excluded
from organizing their affairs in the international order. In spite of this
situation, some Latin American states adopted the Calvo Doctrine, which
maintains that the host country has jurisdiction to settle foreign
investment disputes.8 Arbitration as a means of settling international
commercial disputes with some states, has its antecedents in this era.9
However, the use of force and colonial dominance as dispute settlement
mechanisms continued to influence the reactions of Third World states to
foreign investment and informed the actions they embarked on, including
5. ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 224 (2004).
6. See Vandevelde, supra note 3, at 159.
7. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 37 (2d
ed. 2004).
8. Latin American states were not alone in adopting the Calvo Doctrine. Before
many developed states became parties to the Energy Charter Treaty, they employed
similar arguments that excluded oil and gas disputes from international arbitration. See
Thomas Walde, Investment Arbitration Under the Energy Charter Treaty: From Dispute
Settlement to Treaty Implementation 14, (Oct. 1998), available at
http://www.dundee.ac.uk/cepmlp/ ouma/htmVIVoll/article1 -I 0.pdf.
See generally Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Toward a greater Depoliticization of Investment
Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA (1993), for a discussion of the Calvo clause in
the ICSID context.
9. See Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing
Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419, 431 (2000).
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the perceived need to rewrite the rules of international law, after the end
of direct colonial domination.
B. The Decolonization/Early Postcolonial Era
In the early postcolonial era, a new mechanism of investment
dispute settlement-institutionalized investor-state arbitration-emerged.
At this time, the dominant technologies of the colonial era were no
longer legally and directly available. While state-state dispute settlement
predominated in the colonial era, the early postcolonial era witnessed the
institutionalization of investor-state arbitration. When ICSID was
established in 1966, at the height of the decolonization era, it represented
an attempt to provide a treaty-based international mechanism for settling
investment disputes between newly independent Third World states and
foreign investors. 10  As a result of ICSID's establishment, dispute
settlement between investors and states was institutionalized for the first
time, as a depoliticized dispute settlement mechanism.ll
Several factors shaped the emergence and character of ICSID. In
the post-WWII period, investment disputes became increasingly
internationalized because they were subject to international arbitration
and international law emerged as the primarily applicable substantive
law. 12  This shift was mainly due to the perception of transnational
corporations ("TNCs") and their home states, that the application of the
host state's law and adjudication by domestic tribunals might be
prejudicial to their interests.13 By placing investment disputes within the
international domain, former colonial powers could ensure that their
economic interests remained within structures that were accessible to
(and dominated by) them at that time. Therefore, investment arbitration
has been rightly described as a "Third-World type" discipline, even
though the system is beginning to incorporate developed states within its
purview. 
14
10. See Report of the Executive Directors on the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 4
I.L.M. 524 (1965), arts. 9-13 [hereinafter ICSID Report]. See also ICSID Convention,
supra note 2, at pmbl.
11. Pre-ICSID ad hoc investor-state arbitration includes the 1930 Lena Goldfield
Arbitration. See Arthur Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. &
the Soviet Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31 (1950).
12. See generally Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu
Dhabi, 1 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 247 (1952); Ruler of Qatar v. International Marine Oil Co.
Ltd., 20 I.L.R. 534 (1953); Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117
(1958).
13. See Jan Paulsson, Delocalisation of International Commercial Arbitration: When
and Why it Matters, 32 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 53 (1983).
14. See Walde, supra note 8, at 28.
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The ICSID Convention was drafted in the heydays of Third World
nationalist convergence and at a time when the vestiges of direct colonial
domination were crumbling. In addition to the changing views of Third
World states in international fora in the early postcolonial era,
demonstrated by the United Nations General Assembly's New
International Economic Order ("NIEO") project, the wave of
nationalizations that accompanied the decolonization movement posed
threats to the economic interests of erstwhile colonial powers and
necessitated the development of investment protection mechanisms
separate from the domestic jurisdiction of host states. ICSID was
established in the euphoria of these ideologically charged times. It filled
the need to protect foreign investment in the Third World and suggested
that the promise of investment protection would attract foreign
investment to the Third World. 15 In spite of the suspicions surrounding
international arbitration, a considerable number of Third World states,
excluding most of Latin America, signed the ICSID Convention at its
inception in the hopes of reaping the benefits of the institution. 16 Thus,
with developed countries' need to protect foreign investment and the
Third World's desire to increase private capital flows, ICSID found its
place in the multifarious world of international investment dispute
settlement.
C. The New Phase of Investment Dispute Settlement
The mid-1990s signaled the beginning of the present dispensation in
the international investment order, where there has been a proliferation
of investor-state dispute settlement cases, and where developed states
have emerged as defendants in some of these proceedings.' 7 In this era,
the locus of interaction has expanded to include states, foreign investors,
and non-disputing parties that are granted limited privileges as amicus
curiae. More significantly, this is an era in which developed states are
once again significantly engaging in re-development of the rules
governing the system. Like the crop of investment law that applied
during the colonial and postcolonial eras, there is a reiteration of the
development of international investment law in a manner that
systematically resists peculiar Third World influence. However, unlike
15. See ICSID Report, supra note 10, at arts. 9,12.
16. For reasons on Third World states' early ratification of the ICSID Convention,
see Ibironke T. Odumosu, The Antinomies of the (Continued) Relevance of ICSID to the
Third World, 8 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 345, 355-56 (2007).
17. Although developed states have defended some investment cases, it does not
suggest that they form the majority of defendants that appear before investment dispute
settlement tribunals. Rather, Third World states still form the overwhelming majority of
defendants.
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the colonial and decolonization periods, the rules are not being
reformulated in this era solely to protect foreign investment in the Third
World, but also seek to protect the interests of defendant states in
investor-state arbitration proceedings. The rationales for the emerging
rules are strikingly familiar as they echo earlier Third World arguments
(which were not favorably received) on the invasive nature of some
international investment rules.
Before the 1990s, investment rules seemed settled, at least from the
perspective of major capital exporting countries, until rules formerly
applied almost exclusively to the Third World in dispute settlement
proceedings were extended to developed-state defendants. Suddenly, the
rules appeared inadequate and biased in favor of investors, and
economically powerful states increasingly adopted formerly untenable
Third World arguments. These earlier rejected arguments, including
concerns about the erosion of (regulatory) sovereignty, have gained
currency in some fora. 18  There are now appeals to the prevalent
discourse of humanitarianism that pervaded international law in the
second half of the 2 0 th century. The changes in the new phase of
investor-state dispute settlement smacks of the general trend in
international economic law where accepted rules mostly derive from the
initiative of economically powerful states, or are at least sanctioned by
these states. One of the changes that have emerged in this phase of
investment dispute settlement is the admission of non-disputing parties',
primarily nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"),1 9  limited
participation as amicus curiae where such privileges are granted.2° With
this participation, investment law is infused with public interest
concerns, such as environmental and human rights causes.
The changing investment dispute settlement order is mostly a brain-
child of the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")
developed-state parties.21 This developing investment order is somewhat
sympathetic to the views of these states, which have had to defend their
policies and actions in investor-state arbitration. One cannot but
acknowledge that investment arbitration in its present state has the
18. See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William Park, The New Face of Investment
Arbitration: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 368-71 (2003).
19. The definition of the term "NGO" varies. In this article, the term "NGOs"
mostly refers to not-for-profit, non-governmental expert organizations that sometimes
participate in investment dispute settlement cases.
20. See Rule 37(2), ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings,
ICSID/15 April 2006 (codifying the rule on admission of amicus curiae briefs). For a
discussion of these new rules, see Ibironke T. Odumosu, Revisiting NGO Participation in
WTO and Investment Dispute Settlement: From Procedural Arguments to (Substantive)
Public Interest Considerations, 44 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 353 (2006).
21. See Alvarez & Park, supra note 18 at 366, 370-371.
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potential to benefit all states and that it is relatively more sensitive to the
position of states generally, compared to the earlier fixation on foreign
capital. However, as this article will show, it still remains largely
insulated from Third World sensibilities, and does not necessarily take
Third World struggles, resistances and perspectives into account. As
changes crystallize in the present phase, and as the illustrations in this
article demonstrate, it is imperative that Third World views, interests,
and voices are taken seriously. Barring deliberate engagement with these
"voices," the present crop of international investment law will be a
reiteration of the challenged rules of the colonial era and the manner in
which they became codified.
Given the nature of the emerging changes described above, the
balance of the article examines the law and politics of investment dispute
settlement from the praxis of Third World communities' engagement
with foreign investment and tribunals' responses to such engagement.
On a general level, ICSID tribunals rarely explicitly address the impact
of peoples' engagement with investment activities and, as such, the
effects of resistance from this group on the law are not apparent. This is
a mode of analysis that pervades investment law in general, as
commercial interests and issues predominate. This article's reading of
the institution's jurisprudence suggests that ICSID tribunals' attitude
involves a three-fold mode of analysis. First, the tribunals adopt a
depoliticized (or apolitical) conception of the law. Second, while the
foreign investor includes the corporation and the shareholders, the state
party is often constructed in this forum as an abstract, artificial entity
separate from and divorced from its population. Third, there has been. a
focus on formal participation by institutionalized non-disputing parties.
Proceeding on the basis of these three technologies of investment
arbitration, this article questions the validity and effects of a
depoliticized legal regime (as opposed to a depoliticized institutional
apparatus) and a narrow construction of persons entitled to justice that
tribunals adopt. It suggests that such technologies effectively exclude
peoples' means of engagement with their domestic legal systems from
the international arena and result in a construction of states' responses to
resistance as political acts outside the purview of investment arbitration.
Yet, the impacts of these responses on investments remain subject to
tribunals' scrutiny.
In analyzing ICSID's engagement with the Third World, this article
situates it within a broader socio-legal framework of North-South
relations. It discusses Third World peoples' influence (or lack thereof) in
international investment law, interprets ICSID's depoliticization agenda
in two ways, and reads one of the interpretations as having the potential
to exclude Third World resistance, and discusses ICSID's prevailing
2007]
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conception of relevant interests. It is pertinent to state in this
introductory part of the article that not every form of domestic
populations' engagement with investment activities is covered within the
purview of this article. Rather, the article focuses on those forms of
resistance that inform, either wholly or partially, the actions or regulatory
measures that governments adopt. This article essentially represents an
22
attempt to read some ICSID decisions in light of domestic resistance.
The ICSID case of Tenicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United
Mexican States23 ("Tecmed v. Mexico") forms the major subject of
analysis in this regard. The purpose is to assess the nature of the law that
develops through the process of interaction among relevant actors in this
area of the law. In engaging in an inquiry of this nature, the initial
reaction is to assume that with the history of investment law, the Third
World's position in this order is not the most favorable. But with
increased activism on the part of communities and domestic groups, and
parties' (sometimes inadvertent) pleading of these resistance activities in
investment dispute settlement proceedings, a re-construction (albeit
limited) of the international investment order might be developing.
II. The Face of Third World Peoples in International Investment Law
Even though the international law on foreign investment is
significantly visible to Third World peoples, engagement between Third
World peoples (as opposed to states) and international investment law
has been limited. This area of the law has been considered as an
exclusive domain of states, foreign investors, and dispute settlement
bodies, and this construction largely remains unchanged. However,
starting with Methanex Corp. v. United States ("Methanex v. United
States"),24 NGOs argued their way to formal participation in investor-
state arbitration, following similar advances at the World Trade
Organization ("WTO").25 Whether such participation by NGOs (and
22. This approach mostly falls within a Third World Approaches to International
Law ("TWAIL") perspective. For TWAIL's characteristic "sensibilities," see James
Thuo Gathii, Alternative and Critical: The Contribution of Research and Scholarship on
Developing Countries to International Legal Theory, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 263 (2000);
Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal
Discourse, 16 WIs. INT'L L.J. 353, 360 (1998); Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL?, 94
A.S.I.L. PROC. 31 (2000); Obiora Chinedu Okafor, Newness, Imperialism and
International Legal Reform in Our Time: A TWAIL Perspective, 43 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
171 (2005).
23. Tenicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, 43 I.L.M.
133 (2004) [hereinafter Tecmed v. Mexico].
24. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction
and Merits, 44 I.L.M. 1345 (2005) [hereinafter Methanex v. U S.].
25. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 101, WT/DS138/AB/R (May 10, 2000); Appellate Body
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sometimes, even individuals) leads to substantial consideration of the
impacts of foreign investment on peoples qua peoples is yet to be seen.
Cautionary notes on the impact of NGO participation are necessary
because earlier attempts to incorporate a peoples' perspective in
international economic law, mostly visible in the form of international
resolutions like the General Assembly Resolution on Permanent
Sovereignty over Natural Resources,2 6 and the NIEO declaration are
some of the most contested in international law.27 Even though these
resolutions make several references to "peoples," they did not translate to
direct substantive considerations of the impacts of foreign investment on
Third World peoples. The civil society outcries against investment
treaties in the late 1990s and at the turn of the 21st century are partly a
form of backlash against this neglect.
In spite of investment law's frequent failure to directly address
particular Third World concerns, Third World peoples and groups have
engaged at the domestic level in ways that have been transported to the
international level through parties' arguments in dispute settlement
proceedings. Domestic resistance and expressions of opinion have
forced a situation where tribunals are sometimes compelled to address
the actions of domestic groups in order to reach coherent decisions in the
cases they consider. Perhaps one of the most prominent and well-
publicized popular protests against what was considered an unfavorable
investment policy was the "Guerra del Agua" ("Water War") in
Cochabamba, Bolivia.28 In 1999, the Government of Bolivia and a
Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing
Products, 50-57, WT/DS135/AB/R (March 12, 2001).
26. G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec.
14, 1962). See also Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281,
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/3235 (Dec. 12, 1974). See generally
B.S. Chimni, The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: A Radical
Interpretation, 38 I.J.I.L. 208 (1998) (discussing a Third World perspective on permanent
sovereignty over natural resources); Nico SCHRIJVER, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL
RESOURCES: BALANCING RIGHTS AND DUTIES (James Crawford & David Johnston, eds.,
Cambridge University Press) (1997).
27. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A.
Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (May 1, 1974).
For nuanced critiques of the NIEO, see Dianne Otto, Subalternity and International Law:
The Problems of Global Community and the Incommensurability of Difference, 5 Soc. &
LEGAL STUD. 337, 347-48, 352 (1996); BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW
FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 78-81
(2003).
28. See generally Erik J. Woodhouse, The "Guerra del Agua " and the Cochabamba
Concession: Social Risk and Foreign Direct Investment in Public Infrastructure, 39
STAN. J. INT'L L. 295 (2003); Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno & Tracy Higgins, No
Recourse: Transnational Corporations and the Protection of Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1663 (2004); Andrew Nickson &
Claudia Vargas, The Limitations of Water Regulation: The Failure of the Cochabamba
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consortium-Aguas del Tunari-concluded a forty-year concession
contract for water services in the city of Cochabamba. Several relevant
sectors of the Cochabamba community had complaints about the
concession, including complaints about astronomical tariff rates
increases that were mostly unaffordable for the local population.29
Within a month of the concession contract's conclusion, several
community groups, including farmers, labor groups, environmentalists,
factory workers' unions, organizations of business, political groups, and
several other coalitions of workers, commenced protests in the form of
farmer blockades and general strikes. They also organized peaceful
demonstrations that erupted in violence (termed the "taking of
Cochabamba"), and a final "four day standoff' that resulted in several
injuries and the death of a seventeen year old student.30 Eventually, the
government declared a nation-wide state of emergency and cancelled the
concession contract. The government granted most of the protesters'
requests, although the subsequent state of the water services in the city
was reportedly less than satisfactory. 31 The foreign investor initiated
arbitral proceedings against Bolivia,32 but the case was later settled for a
paltry sum of less than the value of one U.S. dollar.33 The civil society
groups that were the most vocal in these protests have been described as
democratic social movements that became effective by using symbolism
in their work, engaging widespread participation, and obtaining extensive
media coverage of the events.34 In sum, the Cochabamba protests were
as close as one usually gets to hearing the subaltern's voice in the foreign
investment law debate.35
While the Cochabamba water war is perhaps the most pronounced
engagement of citizen groups with foreign investment activities that have
been the subject of ICSID proceedings, there have been other similar
courses of events, albeit with less publicity and intensity but no less
Concession in Bolivia, 21 BULL. LATIN AM. RES. 99 (2002); William Finnegan, Letter
from Bolivia: Leasing the Rain, NEW YORKER, Apr. 8, 2002, at 45.
29. See Woodhouse, supra note 28, at 324-36.
30. See id. at 324-36.
31. See id. at 336-37; see also Finnegan, supra note 28, at 45.
32. Aguas del Tunari SA. v. The Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/02
(Oct. 21, 2005), 20 ICSID REv.-FILJ 450 (2005) [hereinafter AdT v. Bolivia].
33. See Earthjustice, Betchel Surrenders in Bolivia Water Revolt Case, Jan. 19,
2006, available at http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/006/page.jsp?itemlD =
27533393.
34. See Woodhouse, supra note 28, at 339-40.
35. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak? in MARXISM AND
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds.) (1988)
(employing the "speaking subaltern" terminology). See also EDWARD W. SAID,
ORIENTALISM 335 (2d ed., Vintage Books 1994) ("[I]ndeed, the subaltern can
speak....").
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seriousness. In Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States ("Metalclad v.
Mexico"), 36 the tribunal noted that the reasons for denying a permit,
which formed the basis for the dispute, included the local population's
opposition to the operation of the landfill in question.37 In its decision,
the tribunal made a passing reference to this factor and did not accord it
any significant treatment. In another ICSID case, Tecmed v. Mexico,
which forms the subject of analysis in the fourth part of this article, the
local population also raised concerns about the site and operation of a
landfill.38 Unlike the tribunal's near avoidance of the local population's
opposition in Metalclad v. Mexico, and the cursory remarks on the issue
in Aguas del Tunari SA. v. The Republic of Bolivia ("AdT v. Bolivia")39
(perhaps because it was a decision on jurisdiction), the Tecmed v. Mexico
tribunal paid significant attention to the citizens' protests. These three
cases provide examples of dedicated grassroots engagement with
investment activities at the local level that are transmitted to the
international realm through dispute settlement cases. ICSID tribunals'
reactions to local opposition have varied, and as discussed in this article,
such cases are not entirely without precedent.4 °
As stated earlier, even though investor-state arbitration is currently
witnessing NGO participation as amicus curiae, it is important that this is
not taken as adequate representation of the views of Third World masses.
Like the postcolonial state and Third World elite that emerged during the
decolonization era, it is not conclusive that NGOs adequately capture the
interests of Third World masses in their work. This does not imply that
non-disputing party participation in investor-state arbitration does not
serve useful and positive purposes. Nevertheless, it is important to note,
as subaltern studies have shown, that there is a tendency to subsume
dissenting voices under views represented as the universal interests of a
particular country.41  Because investor-state arbitration is legally the
domain of states and foreign investors, Third World peoples' views and
interests have been expressed through the postcolonial state, which has
mostly focused on economic development.42 However, recent popular
36. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/I, 40
I.L.M. 36 (Aug. 30, 2000) [hereinafter Metalclad v. Mexico].
37. See id. at 56.
38. See Tecmed v. Mexico, supra note 23.
39. Part IV of this article analyzes the tribunal's attitude toward the protests.
40. See Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 3, 115-17 (July 20)
[hereinafter ELSI Case]. Unlike ICSID cases, the ELSI Case involved two states.
41. See generally SELECTED SUBALTERN STUDIES (Ranajit Guha & Gayatri C. Spivak
eds., 1988); A SUBALTERN STUDIES READER, 1986-1995 (Ranajit Guha ed., 1997)
[hereinafter SUBALTERN READER].
42. See PARTHA CHATTERIEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND
POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES 202-05 (1993) (noting that economic development emerged as
the single unifying force for the post-colonial state).
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protests and expressions of opinion in some Third World states have
shown that peoples' interests transcend the single economic development
paradigm that it has been constructed to be. Investment dispute
settlement tribunals seldom articulate even the single development
concern of states in their decisions, for in spite of the focus on economic
development at the treaty and contract negotiation levels, investment
dispute settlement cases do not often reflect this major interest area of
Third World states in practice. Additionally, empirical research suggests
that HAs, while ensuring investment protection, do not necessarily fulfill
the promise of investment promotion and development for the Third
World or foster investment flows. 43  Thus, even the much touted
economic development focus of the postcolonial state and HAs hardly
form significant parts of the discussion in investment dispute settlement
cases.
There are visible but small changes in other areas of international
law that now recognize peoples' influence and the interaction of social
movements with international institutions. These include the movement
to interpret the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) in a manner that allows
better access to HIV/AIDS drugs and medicines for other epidemics like
malaria and tuberculosis.44 Also, the aftermath of protests against the
World Bank, for instance, facilitated the establishment of the World
Bank Inspection Panel. Investment dispute settlement in general has
been slow in catching on to such advancements. Popular movements that
challenge the effects of investment activities are not prominent at the
international level; rather, these movements are acquiring non-negligible
status on the domestic level with some trickling effects on the
international level. Resistance by popular movements and the need for
adequate international responses to them have become absolutely
important in an era where it is more or less acceptable that "legal norms
43. See World Bank, Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties
Attract FDI? Only a Bit... and They Could Bite, Working Paper No. 3121 (2003); U.N.
CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. (UNCTAD), BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-
1990s, at 122, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998); Jennifer Tobin & Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environment in Developing
Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties, Research Paper No. 293 (May 2,
2005) (on file with Yale Law School Centre for Law, Economics and Public Policy). For
research that found a strong connection between bilateral investment treaties and
investment flows see, Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties
Increase Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567
(2005); Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An
Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 67 (2005).
44. World Trade Organization, Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health 4, WT/MIN(01)/Dec/2 (Nov. 14, 2001).
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do not arise in a vacuum, but are socially contested, promoted and
legitimized. '45 Giving due deference to such engagement is even more
important at a time when "international law can no longer pretend that
mass resistance from the Third World does not fundamentally shape its
domain., 46 As this article demonstrates, such mass resistance has had a
troubled relationship with investment dispute settlement institutions.
One explanation for the troubled relationship is that institutions like
ICSID, and the tribunals constituted under their auspices, do not take
significant cognizance of the "social origins" of legal rules and
regulations that are addressed in their decisions. This stance is based on
the founding purposes of these institutions and their preoccupation with a
positivist conception of international law.
III. The Technologies/Politics of the New Phase of Investment
Arbitration
The new phase of investment dispute settlement borrows from the
strategies of the earlier eras of this area of the law. As previously
mentioned, in addition to the protection of developed-states defendants,
which is largely new to this phase, the investment protection purpose
remains even if the strategies change. A perusal of the recent
occurrences in investment arbitration and of some ICSID decisions
suggest that Third World peoples acquire a peripheral position in
investment law through at least three strategies that I refer to as the
technologies or politics of the new phase of investment arbitration. They
are, in effect, technologies of exclusion, as they are not necessarily
designed to accommodate purposes beyond those outlined above. Each
of them has antecedents that precede this phase of investment arbitration,
but are presently more pronounced given the purposes and actors that
shape the development of the law in this era.
45. Cecilia Lynch, Political Activism and the Social Origins of International Legal
Norms, in LAW AND MORAL ACTION IN WORLD POLITICS 140, 142 (Cecilia Lynch &
Michael Loriaux eds. 2000).
46. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and Social Movements: Challenges
of Theorizing Resistance, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 397, 400 (2003). The literature
on social movements is vast. See e.g., ROGER BURBACH, ORLANDO NOREz & BORIS
KAGARLITSKY, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: THE RISE OF POSTMODERN
SOCIALISMS (1997); NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE SOUTH: EMPOWERING THE PEOPLE
(Ponna Wignaraja ed. 1993); CULTURES OF POLITICS/POLITICS OF CULTURES: RE-
VISIONING LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Sonia E. Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino &
Arturo Escobar eds. 1998). For analysis of Third World social movements' engagement
with international law, see Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The
Third World, Social Movements and the Expansion of International Institutions, 41
HARv. INT'L L.J. 529 (2000).
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A. Institutionalization
It is evident that the recent NGO excursion into the realm of
investor-state arbitration is no longer news. In some fora, this signals
the arrival of the golden age of civil society participation in investor-state
arbitration. In practice, this movement is largely driven by Western
NGOs, with significant participation by Third World NGO groups.
Three of the most prominent examples of cases where Third World
groups have sought participatory status are the Bolivian groups' (and
individuals) application inter alia for amicus curiae status along with
Western NGOs in AdT v. Bolivia,48 the involvement of three Tanzanian
groups in Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of
Tanzania ("Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania"),49 and four Argentine groups'
submission of a petition for participation as amicus curiae in Suez,
Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal
S.A. v. The Argentine Republic.5 °
While NGO partnership occupies a relevant place in the developing
foreign investment order, like any other movement, it has its limitations.
Several reasons account for these limitations. First, the NGO movement
in investor-state arbitration is mostly elite. From the elite capturing of
the decolonization movement, Third World peoples have learned to be
wary of groups, even domestic, that seem to appropriate their voice, or
claim to project their interests at national and international levels.5' And
47. See Methanex v. US., supra note 24, at Part IV, Chapter B 27, 1446 (showing
the tribunal's acceptance and brief consideration of amicus curiae briefs in its decision on
the merits).
48. Unlike the other examples cited in this article, this case is one of the very rare
instances where the domestic groups that petitioned the panel were mostly grassroots
movement groups. The groups' application was rejected. See AdT v. Bolivia, supra note
32 (noting that several Bolivian civil society groups and even individuals applied inter
alia for amicus curiae status in AdT v. Bolivia. Earthjustice and the Center for
International Environmental Law acted as counsel for the petitioners). See also Non-
Disputing Parties' Petition (August 29, 2002), available at
http://www.ciel.org/Publications/PetitionRevisedAug02.pdf.
49. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case
No. ARB/05/22 (Nov. 2, 2005) [hereinafter Biwater Gauffv. Tanzania] (three Tanzanian
public interest groups, the Lawyers' Environmental Action Team, the Legal and Human
Rights Centre and the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme, and the Center for
International Environmental Law and the International Institute for Sustainable
Development applied for participation as amicus curiae). See also Biwater Gauff v.
Tanzania Procedural Order No. 5, 46 I.L.M. 572 (Feb. 2, 2007).
50. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal
S.A. v. The Argentine Republic, Order in Response to a Petition by Five Non-
Governmental Associations to Make an Amicus Curiae Submission, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19 (Feb. 12, 2007), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/
ARB0319_ORDER.pdf [hereinafter Vivendi v. Argentina].
51. See generally SUBALTERN READER, supra note 41.
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even more relevant is the fact that the NGO movement in investor-state
arbitration sometimes reiterates that it does not seek to represent any
affected party's position but to present tribunals with arguments that aid
robust decision-making. Second, participation at this level requires
groups to have significant funding, and to an extent, subscribe to the
views of NGOs that possess the expertise and the financial resources to
participate in the ICSID dispute settlement process. In this regard, it is
noteworthy that there is no ICSID case involving NGO participation that
has been exclusively orchestrated by groups from the Third World. Due
to the aforementioned limitations of the NGO model in capturing
grassroots resistance, this article focuses on grassroots movements and
their influence on investment dispute settlement, without diminishing the
relevance of NGO involvement and its potential for addressing relevant
Third World concerns.
As stated earlier, NGO involvement as amicus curiae in investor-
state arbitration is one of the innovations of the present era.52  It
represents investment law's (institutionalized) concession to incorporate
non-traditional actors. In its present incarnation, the amicus curiae
model does not necessarily accommodate grassroots social movements in
the Third World that challenge investment activities and rules that are
inimical to Third World interests. Two of the most prominent reasons
are that the grassroots movements are largely not institutionalized, and
do not possess the expertise that is required for participation as amici.
Even if grassroots movements metamorphosed to institutionalized groups
for the purpose of investment dispute settlement proceedings, they may
only proceed as amicus curiae and not as parties to the dispute.5 3 Since
amici are "friends of the court" and not parties, and because the
opportunity is only available at the dispute settlement level when a
dispute has already arisen, proceeding as amici might not address
immediate needs and perspectives of Third World communities. Thus,
investment arbitration's procedural advances remain limited in
addressing questions of resistance. Because of the limitations of
institutionalization, Third World states remain the direct representatives
of their citizens in this area of international law.
B. Representation: A Focus on Technical Justice
So far, this article has advanced the position that ICSID tribunals
52. See Steve Chamovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 185 (1997) (discussing the history of NGOs'
participation in international law).
53. In AdT v. Bolivia, the local groups that protested the terms of the investment that
was the subject of the dispute sought participatory status in the proceedings.
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have been largely unable to incorporate "uninstitutionalized" Third
World groups and communities in their decisions because of a focus on
institutionalization. Another reason proffered in explanation of this
attitude and explored in this section, is the view that tribunals are
constituted to serve the interests of the parties to the dispute, a duty that
forms the core of their mandates. While this view is not problematic at
first glance, complications arise when the parties are unveiled.
Generally, parties to ICSID proceedings are narrowly constructed as the
foreign investor (as the corporation and/or shareholders) and the state (as
an entity separate from 'its population). While the definition of the
foreign investor is fairly accurate, this construction of the state party
mostly stems from the frequent failure to distinguish between
international commercial arbitration and international investment dispute
settlement; the former being a system of settling commercial disputes
between (mostly) private parties, while the latter necessarily involves
states with their public interest considerations.54 The scope of the
interests that tribunals serve is of paramount importance, as some
commentators have noted that "[q]uite understandably, arbitrators do not
normally see themselves as guardians of the public interest. '' 55 Based on
such statements, the tribunals' frequent lack of engagement with the
interactions between grassroots movements and foreign investment
suggest that they see themselves as serving only very limited interests.
Clearly, tribunals are constituted to serve the interest of justice; however,
this begs the question: justice for whom? This article advances two
possible responses to this question in this section. The possibilities lead
to similar conclusions on the need to re-conceptualize and re-appraise the
interests that shape the course of the international law on foreign
investment. The first of those responses, and arguably the more
controversial, is justice for the international community. The second is
justice for the parties.
Considering justice for the international community, the argument
that ICSID tribunals should consider the broader impact of decisions on
the international community is plausible for several reasons.56 First,
ICSID is the product of a multilateral international treaty, with 143
contracting state parties (and 155 signatory states), nearly as many as the
54. See M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INvEsTMENT DISPUTES 159-
61 (2000) (providing a useful distinction between international investment arbitration and
international commercial arbitration).
55. Alvarez & Park, supra note 18, at 394.
56. For a nuanced analysis of the international status or otherwise of ICSID, see
STEPHEN J. TOOPE, MIXED INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: STUDIES IN ARBITRATION
BETWEEN STATES AND PRIVATE PERSONS 233-45 (1990).
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150 WTO member states.57 The treaty presupposes a commitment to the
development of an international order that takes the broader interests of
the international community into account. The ICSID Convention
asserts "the need for international cooperation for economic
development. 5 8 Second, the institution seeks to further the development
of the international law on foreign investment.59 Such law can hardly be
developed without the consideration of the broader interests of the
international community in ICSID tribunals' decisions, and how such
decisions fit within general international law rules. Assuming tribunals
are to act in the interest of justice for the international community, it is
relatively easy and appropriate to conclude that arbitral tribunals are
obliged, if not obligated, to take communities' interests and expectations
into account during decision-making.
Because it can be argued that the suggestion that tribunals have
been formed in the interest of justice for the international community
would over-extend the reach of the ICSID, the position that tribunals
have been established in the interest of justice for the parties and parties
only, may be more plausible. Nevertheless, this does not lead to a
different conclusion on the need to clearly address the interests of
domestic communities. The ICSID Convention (as the principal
document) and investment agreements (as supplementary documents)
identify parties to ICSID proceedings. Investor parties have included
corporate entities and shareholders.6 ° Without suggesting that their
claims are always successful, the interests of investors are relatively well
catered to, as the commercial interests of investors-corporations and
shareholders alike-form the crux of investment disputes.
While the definition of corporate entities is relatively
straightforward, the composition of state parties to disputes is not as
clear. Apart from the state, Articles 25(1) and 25(3) of the ICSID
Convention envisage situations where a constituent subdivision or
agency of a state could be a party to dispute settlement proceedings
(where the state designates such constituent subdivision or agency to
57. See The World Bank Group: ICSID, List of Contracting States and Other
Signatories of the Convention, Dec. 15, 2006, available at http://www.worldbank.org/
icsid/constate/c-states-en.htm; World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, Jan.
11, 2007, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm.
58. ICSID Convention, supra note 2, at pmbl. (emphasis added).
59. See id. at Reg. & Rules 22(2).
60. See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal
S.A. v. The Argentine Republic Decision on Jurisdiction 46-51 (August 3, 2006),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/ARB0319_Decisionon
Jurisdiction03-19.pdf (noting that the corporate entity and the shareholders were parties
to the dispute and the former could withdraw from the proceedings (with the consent of
the state party) without having any substantial effect on the proceedings).
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ICSID), although this has not been a frequent occurrence. 6' Otherwise,
the state is responsible for the actions of its subdivisions under the rules
of state responsibility in international law. Thus, states (as undivided
entities) and foreign investors remain the principal parties before ICSID.
Before addressing the composition of a state, it is necessary to determine
the appropriate state party to disputes, that being the state or the
government. This inquiry is not merely academic, for in some cases, the
state parties are specifically identified as the government and in others,
identified as the state.6 z While most cases name the state as the party to
ICSID proceedings, in Canada's NAFTA cases, the proceedings are
initiated against the "Government of Canada., 63 This does not seem to
arise from any nuance in the NAFTA, but rather as a preference for a
particular style of cause. Irrespective of the proper nomenclature, states,
not governments, form the subject of the analysis in this article for
several reasons. First, Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, which
establishes the jurisdiction ratione materiae and the jurisdiction ratione
personae of the institution, addresses contracting states as parties to
disputes.64 Second, even if governments are named as parties to
investment disputes, it does not necessarily detract from the reality that
governments change and regardless of the government that concludes
investment agreements or the one that allegedly breaches them, the state,
broadly defined, is held accountable. Governments named as the parties
to investment disputes arguably act, or should act, in the interests of
citizens. Therefore, they are entitled to protect the interests of the people
they represent, just as the foreign investor protects its commercial
interests and those of its shareholders.
The concept of statehood as defined mostly by classical principles
of international law has had a troubled history, yet the state remains the
principal subject of international law, and investment dispute settlement
is no different. This article does not participate in the debate on the
61. See, e.g., ICSID, Government of the Province of East Kalimantan v. PT Kaltim
Prima Coal, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/3 (pending as of Aug. 31, 2007); ICSID, Tanzania
Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Independent Power Tanzania Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/8
(July 12, 2001), 8 ICSID REP. 226 (2005).
62. In all the ICSID cases mentioned in this article, except (the Canadian cases and)
those initiated by or against constituent subdivisions or agencies of states, proceedings
are initiated against the state.
63. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada,
http://www.dfait.gc.ca/tna-nac/gov-en.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
64. See ICSID Convention, supra note 2, at art. 25(1) ("The jurisdiction of the
Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a
Contracting State (or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State
designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another Contracting State, which
the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. When the parties
have given their consent, no party may withdraw its consent unilaterally.").
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utility of statehood in the international order.65  Rather, the article
considers statehood to the extent that the state may qualify as a suitable
entity for incorporating peoples' perspectives and interests in investment
law. As laid down in the first article of the Montevideo Convention, the
criteria for statehood include not only a defined territory, a government,
and the capacity to enter into relations with other states, but also a
"permanent population.' 66 Professor Crawford notes that "[i]f States are
territorial entities, they are also aggregates of individuals, 67 and I would
add, constituted by diverse communities and sometimes even nations.68
These communities' agencies are not usually recognized as separate from
those of state parties (subject to the law on self-determination). Their
interests are subsumed under, and equated with those of states, in
international law's limited conception of statehood, which mostly denies
the plurality of states. Even within this limited conception, by the very
definition of statehood, arbitral tribunals are by implication entrusted
with the interests of a states' population in settling investment disputes.
A call for a reassessment of the technical justice paradigm that has
prevailed, in favor of a more robust analysis that actively incorporates
the interests of peoples, is incomplete without a consideration of the
representative nature of the states and governments. This consideration
is especially necessary since the postcolonial state has emerged as a
problematic category with regards to the adequacy of representation of
the interests of its diverse populations. Essentially, de-legitimizing
popular protests (both at domestic and international levels) organized
against allegedly harmful investment activities resonates with
65. For a critique of statehood and the attempt to re-conceptualize the "global social
life" in terms of individuals, while neglecting communal forms of social life, see MARTTI
KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ARGUMENT 499-500 (1989). See also Martti Koskenniemi, The Future of Statehood, 32
HARV. INT'L L.J. 397, 407 (1991). For Third World approaches to the problems of
statehood, see OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR, RE-DEFINING LEGITIMATE STATEHOOD:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE FRAGMENTATION IN AFRICA (2000); ANGHIE, supra note
5, at 108; Makau wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa?: A Moral and Legal
Inquiry, 16 MICH. J.INT'L L. 1113 (1995).
66. Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), Dec.
26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19. See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-55 (2d ed. 2006). See Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2
R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm Ct. Arb. 1928) for Judge Huber's statement on independence as
a criterion for statehood.
67. CRAWFORD, supra note 66, at 52.
68. This does not imply that I subscribe to the view that "permanent populations" in
states is synonymous with the nation, as a sociological reality. See Obiora Chinedu
Okafor, After Martyrdom: International Law, Sub-State Groups, and the Construction of
Legitimate Statehood in Africa, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 519 (2000), for a discussion of
Asbjorn Eide's point that from international law's standpoint "the 'permanent population'
is synonymous with 'the nation' whereas this does not necessarily hold true from "a
social or anthropological perspective."
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technologies of exclusion that were prevalent during the colonial and
early postcolonial eras, as well as during the contemporary period.69
Professor Orford captures the situation accurately when she states that
"the rational, ruthlessly ordered world of sovereign states has no place
for those portrayed as unruly, disordered, subversive, primitive or
irrational."7 °  By discounting popular protests in investment dispute
settlement, the state is read as separate from the people it represents in
order to facilitate an easier process that avoids the consideration of the
public interest and broader socio-political backgrounds to legal issues.
By this implicit separation of the states from its people, the former is
stripped of its population with all its appendices-the public interest,
dissenting voices, and needs that do not equate with global capitalist
ideology-and is left with a not-so-abstract but artificial construct,
known as government and territory.7 It is noted that this view is
contrary to similar analyses that seek a voice for peoples by arguing for a
separation of state and peoples.72 Even though the separation argument
is compelling in relation to many areas of the law, it might not achieve
the commentators' purpose in investment dispute settlement.
Without suggesting that postcolonial states have been adequately
representative of the interests of their subaltern communities,7 3 by the act
of separation of state and peoples in investment dispute settlement,
communities, which have no international legal personality, become
completely invisible in international law. While it is difficult to argue
for a single public interest in a state, and doing so would reinforce and
re-inscribe the erasure of some views and silence some voices, foreign
investment activities sometimes affect distinct peoples and create
situations where some interests can be specifically identified. This does
not, however, imply that the interests of the same group will be the same
for all purposes, but with regards to the investment activity in question,
locating the public interest to be protected may be less problematic.
69. For a similar analysis with regard to the International Monetary Fund, see
Sundhya Pahuja, Technologies of Empire: IMF Conditionality and the Reinscription of
the North/South Divide, 13 LEIDEN J.INT'L L. 749, 798 (2000).
70. Anne Orford, The Uses of Sovereignty in the New Imperial Order, 6 AUSTRL.
FEMINIST L.J. 63, 72 (1996).
71. For arguments regarding the substantive nature of statehood, see HILARY
CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
FEMINIST ANALYSIS 170 (2000). I acknowledge that equating the state with its peoples
might sometimes yield negative results. See e.g., ICSID, Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic
of Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/94/2 (1999) (the tribunal refused to attribute the
actions of a group of villagers to the Albanian government, for several reasons including
the lack of adequate proof of forceful possession of the claimant's property).
72. See e.g., Pahuja, supra note 69, at 798, 800.
73. On the postcolonial state's complicity "in the silencing of subalternity" see Otto,
supra note 27, at 339.
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Thus, a separation of state and peoples in investment dispute settlement,
like in some facets international human rights law for example, is only
meaningful where peoples' agency is recognized as separate from that of
states. However, since investment law has not proceeded in this
direction, it is imperative to adopt, at least within the category of cases
considered in this article, a robust construction of the state as a category
that represents the interests of real people and treat it as such.
In sum, irrespective of whether ICSID tribunals are constituted in
order to ensure justice for disputing parties, or the international
community, or both, their mandate cannot exclude the population of state
parties to disputes. Given the inherent interest of Third World peoples in
the result of investment cases, it becomes necessary to adequately engage
with those cases that implicate the public interest, as well as those in
which parties directly plead the incidence of resistance at the domestic
level before tribunals.
C. Depoliticization: Two Readings
Regardless of what proponents and critics may assert about the
institution, one of ICSID's major contributions to investment arbitration
is the exclusion of a foreign investor's home state from formal
participation in dispute settlement once a claim has been submitted to
ICSID.7 4  The ICSID Convention deems the exclusion of diplomatic
protection of foreign investors necessary in order to balance the interests
of capital importing states against those of powerful capital-exporting
states and their nationals who invest abroad.75 In ICSID parlance, this is
generally referred to as ICSID's ability to depoliticize investment
disputes. Although this is the oft-referred-to angle of the depoliticization
agenda, one could read depoliticization in more than one way. The first
and more common view, depoliticization of disputes, involves avoiding
espousal of investors' interests by their home states.76 The second view
entails a separation of "law" from its socio-economic, cultural and
political origins and ramifications. It is this second seldom-
acknowledged view that rejects Third World resistance as extra-legal. In
the same vein, domestic rules adopted in response to such opposition are
usually deemed to be in violation of the law, as was demonstrated by
Tecmed v. Mexico. Such interpretation generally proceeds from the
adoption of the liberal ideal of ensuring a public/private divide and a
74. See ICSID Convention, supra note 2, at art. 27(1).
75. See generally SHIHATA, supra note 9. See also Andrew Jacovides, International
Tribunals: Do they Really Work for Small States?, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 253
(2001).
76. See generally SHIHATA, supra note 9.
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politics/law divide.77
Even though the depoliticization agenda, in the first sense described
above, is a laudable goal, given the general nature of international
investment law, investment dispute settlement always remains politicized
to an extent, at least, at the international level. For instance, investment
dispute settlement engages in the political act of internationalizing
disputes and largely excluding them from the domestic jurisdiction of
states. Also, states have a stake in the interpretations of clauses and the
jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals. Although states establish
international institutions and conclude treaties among themselves, they
effectively retain some supervisory role over these mechanisms. A case
in point is the interpretation adopted by the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission, which comprises the three state parties to NAFTA, in
2001.78 Of course, it might not be ICSID's role to address the
politicization of investment disputes on a general international level,
especially between Third World states on the one hand, and foreign
investors and developed home states on the other hand. However, one
cannot ignore the reality that international investment dispute settlement
can be an arena for power struggles aimed at espousing particular
viewpoints as representing the prevailing position on the international
law on foreign investment.
Depoliticization in the second sense-stripping law of its socio-
economic, political and cultural backgrounds-is partly responsible for
the inability to effectively engage resistance in ICSID decisions. It
smacks of a re-politicization agenda as the excursion into the rationale
for adopting domestic regulatory measures can itself be arbitrary. Yet,
tribunals cannot completely avoid such inquiries because measuring
governments' actions against the provisions of IIAs sometimes
necessitates such investigation. Often, IIAs dictate that tribunals
determine whether measures violate most favored nation treatment
(MFN), national treatment (NT), and fair and equitable treatment clauses
and so on. The nature of some of these clauses requires an inquiry into
the origin and nature of laws and regulatory measures. This is however,
limited to interpretation of actions in light of applicable law, and not a
questioning of the wisdom of domestic policies. By privileging some
reasons for adopting regulatory measures over others, tribunals are
involved in highly political inquiries, which they purport to exclude in
the first place. Thus, it is one thing to deem a regulatory measure illegal,
77. For an insightful interpretation of arbitral awards in light of the (neo)liberal
public/private divide, see Shalakany, supra note 9, at 453-56.
78. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes on Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11
Provisions (July 31, 2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/NAFTA-
Interpr-en.asp.
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it is another to interpret it as arbitrary or unreasonable because it was
adopted in response to public demand.
The second conception of depoliticization described above partly
accounts for the inability to incorporate robust Third World perspectives,
articulated by Third World peoples' movements, in investment dispute
settlement. Law as a discipline seeks to preserve the sanctity of its realm
and holds itself out as separate from other disciplines. However, by
law's very nature in regulating social life, it is nearly impossible to
divorce it from the social.79 Law constitutes society and is, in turn,
constituted by sociological factors. Domestic and international law are
responses to socio-political and economic circumstances, while also
shaping these circumstances. 80 This insight is not new, as the social,
political and historical contingency of law has been the subject of much
scholarly debate.8' Even international law and international relations
scholars carved out spaces of dialogue toward the end of the 2 0 th century
to discuss, analyze and systematically address international law's
interaction with politics and how one informs, shapes and disciplines the
other.82
To the extent that law is indeterminate and international actors seek
79. See MARGARET DAVIES, ASKING THE LAW QUESTION 228 (1994) (stating that "we
are never free from our social environment.").
80. See Balakrishnan Rajagopal, International Law and the Development Encounter:
Violence and Resistance at the Margins, 93 ASIL PROC. 16, 26 (1999) (noting that the
creation of the World Bank Inspection Panel was driven by several factors including the
struggles of India's Narmada Bachao Andolan).
81. Critical legal studies (CLS) scholars engaged the social contingency of law in the
1970s and 1980s, and before them, realists in the early 1900s. See generally AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher, Morton J. Horwitz & Thomas Reed eds., 1993).
For an exposition of CLS perspectives and their limitations, see Allan C. Hutchinson &
Patrick J. Monahan, Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama
of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199, 206 (1984). Hutchinson and
Monahan note that for CLS scholars, "law is simply politics, dressed [up] in different
garb." This article does not completely subscribe to this radical version of law's
engagement with politics. Instead, it adopts the position that law is contingent on many
factors, including politics; yet it is different from "mere" politics. For seminal works on
CLS-type perspectives on international law, see DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STRUCTURES (1987); KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 65.
82. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A
Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie
Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205 (1993); Robert 0. Keohane, International Relations and
International Law: Two Optics, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 487 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Andrew Tulumello & Stepan Wood, International Law and International Relations
Theory: A New Generation of International Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367 (1998).
For a critique of joint international law/intemational relations research, see Martti
Koskenniemi, Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and the Image of Law in International
Relations, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-34 (Michael Byers ed. 2000).
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deterninacy, especially in dispute settlement, a rulebook conception of
law is at once necessary but, at the same time, inadequate and
inaccurate.83 It is necessary because of the need to settle disputes in
accordance with the letter and spirit of the law; yet it is incomplete
because of the difficulty inherent in divorcing law from society. The
effect given to surrounding factors depends on how one defines law,
whether in a liberal positivist fashion, in a sociological and interactional
manner, or in a myriad of other ways. In departing from the liberal
positivist tradition, Professors Finnemore and Toope adopt the view that
"[l]aw is a broad social phenomenon deeply embedded in the practices,
beliefs, and traditions of societies, and shaped by interaction among
societies. 84  Beyond politicians tinkering with laws, there emerge
situations where popular opinion suggests the adoption of domestic legal
rules. As the next part of this article demonstrates, international
investment law's interaction with such domestic legal rules, has been at
the very least, problematic.85
The idea that international law provides an apolitical means of
settling international disputes has been the subject of much criticism,
prompting Professor Martti Koskenniemi to suggest that international
law oscillates between apologetic arguments on normativity and
utopianism. 86 On the one hand, international law is apologetic when
conceived of as too dependent on states' political power, and on the
other, it is perceived as utopian when based on a moralistic character that
seeks to distance international law from "the realities of power
politics. ' 87  Professor Koskenniemi argues that international lawyers
encounter difficulties in responding to these criticisms. Through the
adoption of reconstructive doctrines that emphasize the normative nature
of international law and its autonomy, international lawyers are
83. On the indeterminacy and the rulebook conceptions of international law, see
SHIRLEY SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 121-28
(2004).
84. Martha Finnemore & Stephen Toope, Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer
Views of Law and Politics, 55 INT'L ORG. 743 (2001). See also Stephen Toope,
Emerging Patterns of Governance and International Law, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 102 (Michael Byers ed. 2000) ("[L]aw arises in the interaction between ideas
(which may be political, philosophical, sociological, or other types of ideas) and practice,
but.., becomes itself through specific juridical processes that serve as part of its
independent justification.").
85. For a call to look beyond a structuralist conception of law and legal relations, see
Roderick A. Macdonald, Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal
Pluralism, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 69 (1998).
86. See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 65, at 50.
87. Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, I EUR. J. INT'L L. 4, 9
(1990).
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vulnerable to the charge of utopianism. 88 And, any argument based on
close connections between international law and state behavior draws
international law further away from a normative posture.8 9 Thus, in the
absence of adequate responses, it seems that international law has to
oscillate between apology and utopia in order to retain its normativity,
and at the same time, also address such issues as justice and equality that
are not solely determined within the law, but in fields like politics and in
other areas of society. It is a reality that international law is itself a
discipline informed by politics. Clearly, law does not exist in a vacuum
and is not separate from sociological factors. In fact, it cannot exist
separate from these factors, or else it will not be rising to its full potential
as the law. This insight necessitates a politics of international law-a
broad framework of a "mutually constitutive relationship" between
international politics and international law.90  It necessitates the
development of an international investment regime that engages with
issues of social pressure related to investment activities, for these social
pressures are often the immediate causes of investment disputes. 9' At
this point in the development of international law, it is difficult to
maintain otherwise.
IV. The Politics of Reading Resistance in Tecmed v. Mexico
Few ICSID tribunals have been directly confronted with the
incidence of grassroots movement opposition to investment activities or
the consequences of governmental responses to such activities. The
Tecmed v. Mexico tribunal was one of such tribunals. The tribunal
addressed the influence of social pressure on the government's decision
that led to the dispute before the tribunal. This phenomenon and the
tribunal's analysis are not entirely foreign to the international law on
foreign investment. The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") faced a
similar situation in the state-state dispute settlement case of Elettronica
Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy) ("ELSI case"), where the World Court
concluded that Italy was not liable for breaches of the Italy/United
States' Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1948 even in
the face of government responses to popular protests.92 However, in
Tecmed v. Mexico, the tribunal found the opposite to be true.
The ICSID tribunal in Tecmed v. Mexico, after engaging in an
analysis of responses to social pressure, found that the government's
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Christian Reus-Smit, The Politics of International Law, in THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (Christian Reus-Smit ed. 2004).
91. See, e.g., AdTv. Bolivia, supra note 32.
92. See ELSI Case, supra note 40.
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response was not proportional to the people's needs and demands on the
one hand, and a deprivation of the investor's investment on the other
hand. The decision sits on a margin between Metalclad v. Mexico and
AdT v. Bolivia, which mostly ignored the resistance question, and the
ELSI case that granted due deference to the realities of the situation that
led to the investment dispute. Tecmed v. Mexico is the quintessential
investment dispute settlement case, raising such issues as the
expropriatory effects of regulatory measures, fair and equitable
treatment, the arbitrariness or otherwise of government regulation,
considerations of public interest, whether the definition of investment
includes both tangible and intangible property, and whether prior,
existing and future investments qualify as covered investments. It is not
the focus of the following analysis to consider the rightness or wrongness
of the tribunal's decision to award compensation for loss of the
claimant's investment. Rather, the analysis turns on the tribunal's
treatment of public protests that preceded the government's action, which
the tribunal considered expropriatory and in violation of the fair and
equitable treatment provision in the bilateral investment treaty (BIT).
Prior to the dispute, Cytrar, a company incorporated in Mexico, was
owned and controlled by another Mexican company, Tecmed Mexico,
which was in turn, owned and controlled by a Spanish parent company,
Tecmed Spain.93 Cytrar operated a hazardous waste landfill in the
municipality of Hermosillo, Mexico.9 4 On November 25, 1998, the
relevant Mexican authority denied Cytrar's application for renewal of the
landfill's operating permit.95 Tecmed Spain, as the parent company,
initiated arbitral proceedings under ICSID's Additional Facility Rules
96
pursuant to the Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection
of Investments between the Kingdom of Spain and the United Mexican
States (Spain-Mexico BIT/the BIT).97 Tecmed Spain claimed inter alia
that the Mexican authorities' actions violated several clauses of the BIT,
that the refusal to renew the permit was effectively an expropriation of its
investments, and that it was entitled to damages and compensation for its
economic lOSS. 98 Mexico disagreed, arguing that the refusal of the permit
was not in the nature of an expropriation, the claimant did not suffer
discrimination, and was not denied national treatment. 99
93. See Tecmed v. Mexico, supra note 23, at 4.
94. See id. at 35.
95. See id. at 39.
96. ICSID Additional Facility Rules, ICSID/I 1, April 2006, available at
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm.
97. See Tecmed v. Mexico, supra note 23, at 4.
98. See id. at 45.
99. See id. at 46-51.
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The claimant alleged that the community movement opposed to the
landfill, coupled with other political issues at the state and municipal
levels, led to the resolution denying renewal of the permit.'00 The
community mostly opposed the operation of the landfill because of its
proximity to a city of about one million people and the manner in which
hazardous toxic waste was transported and confined.10' Mexico
contended that the resolution was an exercise of a control measure in a
"highly regulated sector," which was "closely linked to public
interests,"10 2 and an exercise of its "police power within the highly
regulated and extremely sensitive framework of environmental
protection and public health."'0 3 Mexico asserted that it acted within its
obligations in the BIT in relation to the claimant's investment, in view of
the social pressure, and also sought to find solutions to the problems
resulting from such pressure.'
4
It is important to recall the principle that the mandate of an arbitral
tribunal is limited to disputed issues that the parties specifically submit to
the tribunal.'0 5 The principle does not however, curtail tribunals' power
of interpretation on issues they are seized of. It was in the exercise of
this interpretative authority that the tribunal addressed the impacts of the
public opposition to the landfill, categorized the movement in opposition
to the landfill as political, deemed the social pressure as insufficient to
amount to a "genuine" social crisis, and distinguished Tecmed v. Mexico
from the ELSI case. The decision demonstrates that to construct arbitral
tribunals as private dispute settlement mechanisms that have no
substantial ability to shape the development of international investment
law is to turn away from the analysis they engage in and deny that they
have a significant impact on peoples' lives and livelihoods.10 6
The contested resolution refused renewal of the permit on several
grounds, including environmental considerations.10 7  The claimant
successfully contended that one of the grounds, the violation of some
conditions of its permit, had been addressed by another Mexican
100. See id. at 1 42-43.
101. See id. at 49.
102. Tecmed v. Mexico, supra note 23, at 46.
103. Id. at 97.
104. Seeid. at 50.
105. See id. at 56.
106. In his dissenting opinion in the ICJ's Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (1996 I.C.J. 95), Judge Weeramantry adopted an
approach that emphasized the significance of legal rules and the consequences for the
case before the Court. By addressing the impacts of nuclear weapons, related applicable
laws, and the multicultural and ancient backgrounds of the laws of war, he interpreted
international law in a manner that took the consequences of the legal rules for humanity
into account.
107. See Tecmed v. Mexico, supra note 23, at 99.
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authority, which only required the claimant to pay a fine.'08 Mexico also
conceded that one of the five factors that had significant effects on the
resolution was "the risk that community pressure might increase if
operation of the landfill continued."' 109 Despite its later holding that the
protests were insufficiently serious, the tribunal admitted that the
"community's opposition to the Landfill, in its public manifestations,
was widespread and aggressive, as evidenced by several events at
different times."''110 In addition, a relocation of the landfill was also
contemplated because of the growing concerns on environmental safety,
in view of the rapid growth of the Hermosillo municipality. The tribunal
mostly ignored this consideration focusing mostly on government reports
that the landfill did not compromise ecological stability."' There were
definitely unaddressed environmental issues that the protesting groups
sought to address through their activism.
For all their disagreements in this case, the parties and the tribunal
agreed that Cytrar had agreed to relocate the landfill due to the protests,
with the latter agreeing to incur all the costs necessary for such
relocation, although the relocation was not carried out before the dispute
arose. 112 Undoubtedly, the Mexican authorities and the claimant would
not have subscribed to such proposed action had the protests not been
sufficiently serious to warrant some response and one as drastic as
abandoning the contentious landfill site for another. In fact, discussions
on the relocation continued even after the permit was denied, at least,
during January 2000, but at the time of the ICSID arbitration, such
discussions had ceased. 1 3 However, this article is not concerned with
the party who bears fault for the failed relocation; it focuses squarely on
the tribunal's attempt to undermine the protests and their impact, and on
the law/politics tension inherent in the decision.
In consonance with the practice of many arbitral tribunals, the
Tecmed v. Mexico tribunal focused on the resolution's legality in light of
the BIT. It noted that it found no principle that states' regulatory and
administrative actions per se are excluded from the scope of BITs.
14
This remains so even if the actions are beneficial to society as a whole,
particularly if they have negative economic impacts on the financial
position of the investor." 5 While this seems to be the prevailing position
108. See id. at I 100.
109. Id. at 105.
110. Id. at 108.
111. Seeid. at l10, 124.
112. See Tecmed v. Mexico, supra note 23, at 10.
113. See id. at 143.
114. Seeid. at 121.
115. Seeid. at 120-21.
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in international investment law on the balancing of public interest and
investors' economic interests,' 16 from a public interest perspective, it is
difficult to conceive that the interests of millions of people can be
supplanted for any reason. Recognizing the impacts of its sweeping
comment above, the tribunal argued that having established that
regulatory actions and measures, even though beneficial to society as a
whole, will not be excluded from the definition of expropriatory acts, in
order to determine whether they are in fact expropriatory, it is necessary
to consider whether such measures are proportional to the public interests
"presumably protected" and to the "protection legally granted to
investments."'1 17 By this statement, the tribunal realized the need to
balance the public interest with investors' commercial interests.
However, in engaging in this analysis, the tribunal adopted a perspective
that downplayed the significance of peoples' voices in these matters,
foregrounded the political nature of the protests, and interpreted the
resolution as a response to political circumstances, and contrary to the
BIT. The politicization of the resolution (and the protests) was germane
to the tribunal's conclusion. That there were undoubtedly socio-political
considerations involved in the resolution's conclusions does not
necessarily imply that the resolution itself was inequitable, especially
given the resolution's outlined statute-based rationale for its conclusions,
separate from the social pressure.
In addressing the issue of proportionality, the tribunal opined that
the relevant political circumstance was the community pressure, and
sought to assess the resolution's proportionality to such pressure and to
the "neutralization of the economic and commercial value of the
claimant's investment."' 18 The tribunal adopted the position that the
resolution was driven by socio-political circumstances and not the
"protection of the environment, ecological balance and public health."" 9
By arriving at this decision, the tribunal went beyond the text on the face
of the resolution to consider the factors that influenced the resolution's
issuance. This was in line with its earlier statement that although it
would accord due deference to the state's ability to define its public
policy and societal interests, this does not prevent it from examining the
state's actions in light of the BIT to determine "whether such measures
are reasonable with respect to their goals, the deprivation of economic
rights and the legitimate expectations of who suffered such
116. See Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica,
ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, 39 I.L.M. 1317 (Feb. 17, 2000).
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deprivation." 120 In essence, for the tribunal, the "mischief' 12 that the
regulatory measure sought to "cure" was a socio-political circumstance,
which was unacceptable in light of the BIT.
22
In the tribunal's view, the resolution was not proportionate to the
community pressure it sought to address because such pressure and its
consequences were not large enough to lead to "a serious emergency
situation, social crisis or public unrest, in addition to the economic
impact of such a government action, which in this case deprived the
foreign investor of its investment with no compensation whatsoever.'
' 23
In its opinion, considering the proportionality between the protests and
the resolution, the protests did not give rise to a "serious urgent situation,
crisis, need or social emergency." 124 Yet, the tribunal had referred to the
protests as "widespread and aggressive.' 25
Several questions arise from the tribunal's decision in Teemed v.
Mexico. First, what qualifies as "genuine social crisis"? Second, which
is relevant-the qualitative nature of the protests or their quantitative
strength? In its analysis of the second question, which runs through a
significant portion of the decision, the tribunal pitched its juridical and
intellectual tent with the latter option. The tribunal was of the opinion
that no matter how "intense, aggressive and sustained," the protests were
in no way "massive" because they represented the position assumed by
some individuals or members of some groups. 26 The tribunal stated that
at no time were the protesters more than 400 people strong, and although
the series of events "amount to significant pressure on the Mexican
authorities, [they] do not constitute a real crisis or disaster of great
proportions, triggered by acts or omissions committed by the foreign
investor or its affiliates.'1 27 Here, the tribunal combined the question of
the seriousness of the protests with the party responsible for the actions
that triggered the protests. While this might be relevant for other
analyses, the question of responsibility is mostly irrelevant to the
seriousness of the protests. Even if responsibility were relevant, one
would be reading out relevant facts to assume that Mexico was solely
120. Id. at 122, 128-32.
121. Heydon's Case 3 Co. Rep. 7a (1584); 76 E.R. 637. See also Smith v. Hughes
(1960)1 W.L.R. 830.
122. Cf S.D. Myers Inc. v. Government of Canada 255, Nov. 13, 2000, 40 I.L.M.
1408 (2001) (noting that Canada's indirect motive of ensuring the economic strength of
the Canadian industry was understandable, although its methods contravened its
international obligations under the NAFTA).
123. Tecmed v. Mexico, supra note 23, at 133.
124. Id. at 139.
125. Id. at 108.
126. See id. at 144.
127. Id. at 144.
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responsible for the actions that triggered the protest because it located the
landfill in such close proximity to an urban center. The protests also
challenged the claimant's transportation of hazardous waste, in addition
to the landfill's proximity to the municipality. However, the relevant
issue addressed here is the tribunal's choice of a quantitative analysis of
the protests, not the party responsible for the acts that triggered the
protests.
The quantitative approach does not adequately capture the sustained
public manifestations of the protests. 2 8  In November 1997,
Hermosillo's Alliance for Civic Affairs publicly denounced the acts and
omissions relating to the transportation of the waste.129 At approximately
the same time, about 200 people organized a demonstration, marched to
the landfill, and "symbolically" closed it down. 130  Subsequently,
community organizations had a meeting with government authorities at
all levels.'13  In December 1997, the Sonora Human Rights Academy
filed a criminal complaint against Cytrar, claiming that Cytrar had
committed "environmental crimes."' 3 2 In January 1998, members of the
community organized a blockade of the landfill. 33  Community
organizations then held a sit-in at the town hall lasting 192 days.134 In
September 1998, the Association of NGOs Against Cytrar filed a human
rights claim before the State Commission of Human Rights against the
authorities for ending the town hall sit-in. 35 Finally, in October 1998,
there was a "family demonstration for the defense of health and dignity"
,,136 fo h
against the landfill. Yet, from the perspective of the tribunal, the
protests were not massive enough to be considered a "genuine social
crisis." Ironically, the Cochabamba protests that led to the AdT v.
Bolivia dispute began in similar fashion. The situation that eventually
amounted to a "genuine social crisis" started out as pockets of protesters
contesting unfavorable investment activities. The fact that there were
400 protesters at a time in Hermosillo does not imply that they did not
represent the popular view.
The tribunal distinguished Tecmed v. Mexico from the ELSI case,
128. See Tecmed v. Mexico, supra note 23, at 108 (noting that some of these events
were serious enough to trigger police action).
129. See id. at 108 (stating that the Alliance for Civic Affairs also requested the




133. See Tecmed v. Mexico, supra note 23, at 108 (noting that the blockade lasted
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reasoning that "there are no similar comparable circumstances of
emergency, no serious social situation, nor any urgency related to such
situations, in addition to the fact that the Mexican courts have not
identified any crisis."' 37 In the ELSI case, the ICJ made a finding of
serious emergency and social crisis due to the fact that approximately
1,000 people would have lost their jobs. The job losses would have been
devastating for the workers and their families. There is no record in the
ELSI case of any protests beyond strikes and the barricading/occupation
of the plant. Therefore, the ELSI case is not particularly apposite for use
as a yardstick for measuring the seriousness of social pressures and to
arrive at the conclusion that there was an absence of a genuine social
crisis in Tecmed v. Mexico. Contrary to Tecmed v. Mexico, there seems
to be a continuum of social crises. The location on that continuum
relative to other crises should not diminish the genuine nature of a crisis.
Even though the social situation in the ELSI case was arguably not as
pronounced as that in AdT v. Bolivia, it was accorded the status of a
serious emergency and social crisis. Thus, in determining
proportionality, it is a serious and arduous task to seek to quantify
peoples' suffering, the strength of their opposition, and the impact of
their voices.1
38
It appears that a major challenge for the tribunal in Tecmed v.
Mexico was the delicate balancing and characterization of the issues as
either legal or socio-political. In this case, it seemed convenient to
construct the relevant issues and surrounding circumstances as socio-
political. By this characterization, it was easy to dispose of the
resolution and the issues it sought to address as outside the scope of the
"legal" where investment arbitration is located. The tribunal expressed
this view when it stated that:
[T]he refusal to renew the Permit in this case was actually used to
permanently close down a site whose operation had become a
nuisance due to political reasons relating to the community's
opposition expressed in a variety of forms, regardless of the company
in charge of the operation and regardless of whether or not it was
being properly operated.1
39
The tribunal addressed the community protests in a manner that suggests
that law does not interact with political issues, thereby presenting a false
dichotomy between legal and socio-political issues.
The Tecmed v. Mexico tribunal's discussion of the socio-political
137. See id. at 147.
138. See UPENDRA BAxi, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS xv-xviii, 26-27, 47-50 (2d
ed. 2006).
139. Tecmed v. Mexico, supra note 23, at 164.
[Vol. 26:2
RESISTANCE IN INVESTMENT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
dimensions of the case is reminiscent of and constitutes a re-enactment
of the "law" and "politics" tensions inherent in the Libyan oil
nationalization cases.140  In a sophisticated rereading of the
nationalization cases, Amr Shalakany notes that Libya lost the cases not
because it did anything illegal, but because it engaged in a political act.141
This position becomes especially vivid in Tecmed v. Mexico when
ICSID's background premise on liberal and positivist assumptions of
clear dichotomies between the public (state intervention) and the private
(foreign investment), and politics and law respectively, are taken into
account. As stated earlier, one of the recognized purposes of ICSID is
the depoliticization of investment disputes. However, the subtle form of
depoliticization that occurred in Tecmed v. Mexico involved a separation
of law from its socio-political, economic and cultural background and
ramifications. It was not necessarily depoliticization in the context of
excluding diplomatic protection of investors by their home states, but a
depoliticization of the law itself. By such expressions of legality, the law
is presented as neutral and capable of universalization-an expression,
which in itself is a political act that renders issues that are important to
some irrelevant in international fora. In addition to a preference for a
depoliticized public/private divide, Tecmed v. Mexico also demonstrates
a preference for institutionalized forms of engagement and a less robust
construction of the constitution of state parties to disputes.
To reiterate, the argument advanced in this article focuses on the
importance of recognizing that law is not as neutral as it is sometimes
projected to be and that it cannot be divorced from its socio-political
environment. Conversely, this is not meant to imply that tribunals
should abandon the application of legal rules or principles, or
deliberately supplant certainty for indeterminacy, where the former can
be reasonably attained. As the Chamber of the ICJ noted in the ELSI
case, "[i]t was.., understandable that the Mayor, as a public official,
should have made his order, in some measure, as a response to local
public pressures."'142 In spite of the ICJ's approach in the ELSI case, the
predominant approach in arbitral decisions is to adopt a strict application
of legal rules mostly devoid of equitable factors. The initial tribunal's
award in Klckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. United Republic of
Cameroon & Socigtg Camerounaise des Engrais ("Klockner v.
Cameroon") sought to apply equitable principles like frankness and
loyalty in its examination of the relationship between the state and a
140. See, e.g., Texaco Overseas Petroleum et al. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 17 I.L.M. 1
(1978).
141. See Shalakany, supra note 9, at 455-56, 461.
142. ELSI Case, supra note 40, at 126 (emphasis added).
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foreign investor.143 The ad hoc committee that annulled the award in its
entirety held inter alia that the initial tribunal failed to correctly apply the
law of Cameroon to the dispute. 44  It concluded that the tribunal
exceeded its powers because the tribunal applied equitable concepts and
principles that were outside the scope of the applicable law. 145 One of
the major lessons of Klockner v. Cameroon is that investment arbitration
can be acutely legalistic, largely precluding the application of equitable
principles. And if principles of equity are to be applicable, they have to
be founded solidly on the applicable law and explicitly substantiated,
even where that would not be necessary for other legal principles.
In more recent decisions, considerations of equity have become
valid in arbitral tribunals' decisions. In American Manufacturing &
Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, equitable principles were adopted in
favor of the foreign investor's position. 46 The tribunal found that based
on "practical reasons founded on equitable principles," Zaire, now the
Democratic Republic of Congo, had the duty to compensate the claimant
for losses suffered due to the acts of violence of Zairian armed forces.
147
Another case, World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. The Rep. of Kenya ("World
Duty Free v. Kenya"),148 is often cited as an example of a successful
application of the principles of equity. In World Duty Free v. Kenya
"international public policy" principles were applied when examining
charges of bribery against the claimant foreign investor, which had a
Middle Eastern alter ego. 1
49
Essentially, this article does not suggest that regulatory measures
adopted in response to social pressures are necessarily legitimized by the
interaction of popular will and government action, especially, where
international rules are involved. Rather, it advances the position that
politics of exclusion-positions that exclude peoples' engagement with
investment law and reads them out of its realm-should be excluded
when settling foreign investment disputes. 150 As the ICJ decision in the
143. See Klckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. United Republic of Cameroon &
Socit6 Camerounaise des Engrais, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, 2 ICSID REP. 3, at 26,
59-60 (1994). In addition, the tribunal seemed mindful of Cameroon's economic
situation at the time.
144. See id. at 95 (stating that the initial tribunal correctly identified Franco-
Cameroonian law as the applicable law).
145. See id. at 124-25.
146. See American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case
No. ARB/93/1, 36 I.L.M. 1534, 1553-54 (1997).
147. See id.
148. World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. The Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/7, 46 I.L.M. 337, Oct. 4, 2006.
149. Seeidat 138-57.
150. While social pressure is generally unacceptable, writers adopt the view that in
some limited instances, environmental regulation will not be considered as regulatory
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ELSI case has shown, governmental action in response to social pressure
may not be arbitrary, although by an interpretation of many HAs in force,
it may be expropriatory. Thus, that an action is interpreted as
expropriatory, or in violation of other standards when measured against
an investment treaty, does not imply that such action taken in the face of
public opposition to investment activities is unreasonable, illegitimate, or
representative of a significant departure from the norms of law making.
In sum, the likely practical effects of Tecmed v. Mexico are
significant. It could stifle government responses to the genuine concerns
of its citizens. Further, it could preclude states from advancing public
interest arguments for fear of being accused of engaging in political acts,
thereby obscuring the real reasons for decision-making. In the latter
instance, it may become impossible to glean ICSID tribunals' responses
to, and engagement with, the reality of peoples' concerns. Similarly, it
may become difficult to identify the effects of this interaction on the
international law of foreign investment. Essentially, the Tecmed v.
Mexico decision reveals a disciplining of the administrative procedures
of a Third World state, a decision on what constitutes (un)reasonable
reasons for adopting administrative decisions, a preference for technical
decision making divorced from socio-political considerations, and a good
governance mechanism in action in investment law.
Beyond the likely practical effects of the Tecmed v. Mexico
decision, it has potential positive impacts, even though the situation is
not close to optimal. First, Tecmed v. Mexico's discussion of social
pressure represents a more engaged discussion compared to Metalclad v.
Mexico's near zero engagement with the issue and AdT v. Bolivia's
negligible mention of the protests, which was the determining factor
behind the dispute.1 51 Tecmed v. Mexico demonstrates that it is possible
to discuss peoples' engagement with the law when settling investment
disputes. Second, although not entirely convincing, the Tecmed v.
Mexico tribunal seemed inclined to give effect to regulatory measures
adopted as responses to social protests if the measures were proportional
to the seriousness of the social crisis and the investor's loss. If
investment law could get past the measurement of "serious" social crises,
there is some potential that ICSID tribunals could read peoples'
interactions and the law derived from such interaction as part of the
growing body of international investment law. In the process, it could
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develop a legal regime that is sensitive to the positive and negative
impacts of investment activities.
V. Conclusion
As this article suggests and as scholars that work in the Third World
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) tradition have demonstrated,
the Third World transcends the developing state; it is the subaltern voice
within such states. 152  However, ICSID, like many international
institutions, is not the most hospitable place for Third World
communities of resistance. Third World communities may have the
attention of the World Bank and the WTO (after the Seattle protests of
1999) even though this attention has not produced significant changes,
but given their quasi-judicial nature, institutions like ICSID that serve as
the final arbiter in many investment disputes are mostly insulated from
the views of Third World peoples and even from the relatively slow
progress made in other areas of international law.
Notwithstanding the troubled history of the Third World's
engagement with the international law on foreign investment, ICSID
tribunals have proceeded from near zero mention of peoples'
involvement in the crises that triggered the investment disputes in some
cases to the analysis in Tecmed v. Mexico. Despite its imperfections,
Tecmed v. Mexico represents the first significant engagement with the
activities of Third World peoples in ICSID jurisprudence. It could signal
the beginning of an era where peoples' concerns and activism come to
light in investment dispute settlement. Before this time, peoples'
concerns were largely ignored and written out of the history and the
picture of investment dispute settlement. Through jurisprudence that
discuss peoples' involvement and place in the international investment
order (even in ways that seek to banish them from the realm of the legal),
they (unexpectedly) acquire a voice in investment disputes. For it is
impossible to address what is ignored, but acknowledgement of an issue,
occurrence, or people, empowers in one way or the other.
As long as international actors perpetuate the current structure of
investment dispute settlement, lawyers must become more sophisticated
in including peoples' concerns in their legal arguments, and carefully
couching their positions in legal terms and language. 53 Tribunals have
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an even greater responsibility to interpret the law in a manner that
directly incorporates the interests of peoples in investment dispute
settlement. If lawyers and tribunals follow this path, we may begin to
witness the first sightings of robust international rules on foreign
investment.
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